Interactions among intergovernmental organizations in the anti-corruption realm

Gest and Grigorescu (G&G) study the interactions between intergovernmental organizations working in the anti-corruption area. They argue that IOs will seek to cooperate with others as long as by doing so they do not become dependent on their partners’ resources. Two IOs are unlikely to want to exchange money, prestige, or expertise that each of them truly lack and need. These kinds of relationships are more difficult to abandon. Conversely, IOs that have similar resources are more likely to build collaborative networks by pooling together resources that each of them already own.

G&G identify 17 international organizations working on anticorruption. They also map formal and informal inter-IO networks between 2005 and 2007. By looking at the relative value of different types of resources, the authors account for the varying ability of IOs to become central to these networks. IOs that have many years in the business and a large specialized staff (e.g. the World Bank, the EU, and the OECD) own the most valuable resources for other organizations.

G&G’s organizational map is a useful tool for anticorruption stakeholders navigating the complex world of IOs. The analysis has interesting implications for those trying to promote more efficient allocations of international resources. However, it remains a question what, if any, is the effectiveness of different types of resources and inter-IO networks on the ground.